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In this article, the authors discuss loss 
compensation in connection with cross-border 
reorganizations, in particular the extent to 
which the “no possibilities” test can be relied on 
in claiming compensation for “final losses”.
1.  Introduction
On 13 December 2005, the ECJ handed down a deci-
sion that would spur a heated academic debate: Marks 
& Spencer (Case C-247/08).1 Marks & Spencer plc, a UK 
resident company, held several continental European 
subsidiaries that had become loss-making during the 
1990s.2 Under the United Kingdom’s group relief regime, 
Marks & Spencer sought to offset these losses against its 
UK profits. Group relief, however, was only available to 
UK resident companies or non-resident companies that 
carried on trade in the United Kingdom through a perma-
nent establishment (PE).3 Marks & Spencer was, therefore, 
denied the requested cross-border group relief. According 
to the ECJ, this constituted a restriction on the freedom 
of establishment that was, however, justified based on a 
threefold justification ground: preserving a balanced allo-
cation of taxing powers, preventing losses from being used 
twice, and averting tax avoidance.4 However, when the 
ECJ assessed the proportionality of the outright denial 
of cross-border group relief, it held that allowing for the 
compensation of “final losses” (losses that had become 
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1. UK: ECJ, 13 Dec. 2005, Case C-247/08, Marks & Spencer plc v. David 
Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes), ECJ Case Law IBFD. See, inter 
alia, P.J. Wattel, Annotation to Marks & Spencer, BNB 72 (2006) and 
A. Cordewener, G. Kofler & S. van Thiel, The Clash Between European 
Freedoms and National Direct Tax Law: Public Interest Defenses available 
to Member States, 46 Common Market Law Rev., pp. 1990-1995 (2009).
2. For a discussion of Marks & Spencer and its implications, see S.C.W. 
Douma & C. Naumberg, Marks & Spencer: Are National Tax Systems 
Éclairé?, 46 Eur. Taxn. 9, pp. 431-442 (2006), Journals IBFD.
3. The United Kingdom’s group relief rules that applied for accounting 
periods ending on or before 31 March 2000 required both the 
surrendering company and the claimant company to be resident in the 
United Kingdom (UK: Income and Corporation Taxes Act (ICTA), sec. 
413(5), National Legislation IBFD). For later periods, the availability of 
group relief has been extended to non-resident companies that carry on 
trade in the United Kingdom through a branch or an agency (sec. 402(2)
(b) ICTA). See P. Farmer & A. Last, The Marks & Spencer Group Relief 
Litigation: The No Possibilities Test, in From Marks & Spencer to X Holding. 
The Future of Cross-Border Group Taxation p. 97 (D.M. Weber & B. da 
Silva eds., Kluwer Law International 2011).
4. Marks & Spencer (C-247/08), paras. 42-51.
exhausted in the subsidiaries’ Member States) would make 
the United Kingdom’s group relief regime less restrictive.5
In this contribution, the authors review to what extent 
this “no possibilities test” can be relied upon to ensure 
compensation for “final losses” arising in connection with 
cross-border restructuring operations. The relevance of 
this topic has been reignited by A Oy (Case C-123/11), in 
respect of which Advocate General Kokott delivered her 
Opinion on 19 July 2012 (see section 4.).6
2.  A Broader Perspective
Marks & Spencer should be assessed in the context of a 
series of ECJ cases comprising, inter alia, Schumacker 
(Case C-279/93)7 and Renneberg (Case C-527/06).8 These 
cases concern loss compensation or the granting of per-
sonal allowances (splitting tariff, mortgage interest deduc-
tion, etc.) in cross-border situations.
Schumacker dealt with a Belgian national who worked in 
Germany and who earned his household’s sole income in 
that state. Mr Schumacker was refused the right to claim 
the “splitting tariff”, which was only applicable to married 
employed persons residing in Germany. The ECJ held 
that, generally, a source state may refuse to grant non-
residents certain personal allowances that it grants to 
residents, since, as a rule, the situations of residents and 
non-residents are not comparable. The ECJ, however, 
formulated an important exception to this rule where the 
non-resident’s income in his state of residence is insignifi-
cant and he obtains the majority of his taxable income in 
the source state.9 In this situation, refusing to grant to non-
residents the personal allowances available to residents 
would be tantamount to discrimination in the ECJ’s view.
Renneberg concerned a Netherlands national who resided 
in Belgium and who earned all of his income in the Neth-
erlands. Mr Renneberg sought to deduct the interest 
expense on his mortgage (used to finance his Belgian 
home) against his Netherlands income. A mortgage inter-
est deduction, however, was only available to Netherlands 
residents.10 The ECJ extended the scope of the Schumacker 
5. Marks & Spencer (C-247/08), para. 55.
6. FI: ECJ, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 19 July 2012, Case C-123/11, 
Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö and Valtiovarainministeriö v. A Oy, 
ECJ Case Law IBFD. For a discussion of the A Oy case, see M. Helminen, 
Must the Residence State Allow a Deduction for Foreign-Source Losses in the 
European Union?, 51 Eur. Taxn. 11, pp. 477-482 (2011), Journals IBFD.
7. DE: ECJ, 14 Feb. 1995, Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Roland 
Schumacker, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
8. NL: ECJ, 16 Oct. 2008, Case C-527/06, R.H.H. Renneberg v. Staatssecretaris 
van Financiën, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
9. Schumacker (C-279/93).
10. With either immovable property in the Netherlands that the Netherlands 
resident occupies himself or with immovable property in Belgium that 
the Netherlands resident does not himself occupy on a permanent basis. 
See Renneberg (C-527/06), para. 65.
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account at the level of the German head office. In Austria, 
losses were only compensated if it was not possible to take 
the losses into account in Germany. When the Austrian 
PE became profitable, the previously deducted losses 
were recaptured at the level of the German head office. 
The German legislation would not have provided for such 
recapture if the taxpayer had shown that the Austrian rules 
did not, in general, allow for compensation of its Austrian 
losses (quod non). In regard to a German PE, however, 
no recapture would have occurred at all. Accordingly, the 
tax situation of a German resident company with an Aus-
trian PE was less favourable than it would have been if 
the latter had been established in Germany. The ECJ held 
that the “logical symmetry” of recapturing the previously 
deducted losses was necessary to guarantee the coher-
ence of the German tax system and hence establish that 
the restriction that followed from the recapture was justi-
fied. The fact that the possibility to compensate the losses 
under the Austrian rules could not be put into effect in the 
specific situation, and hence, that the taxpayer ended up 
with a “final loss”, was treated as a disparity by the ECJ. In 
other words, as a disadvantage that did not arise from the 
German tax system itself, but from the allocation of taxing 
powers between Germany and Austria.
Finally, in X Holding BV (Case C-337/08), a Nether-
lands resident parent company sought to form a fiscal 
unity with its loss-making Belgian resident subsidiary.15 
A request thereto was denied, as the Netherlands fiscal 
unity regime was only open to Netherlands resident com-
panies and companies carrying on business in the Nether-
lands through a PE. Just as in Oy AA, the ECJ recognized 
that the freedom of establishment had been infringed, but 
accepted the justification of the need to safeguard the allo-
cation of taxing powers between the Member States.
4.  Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion in the  
A Oy Case
In the A Oy case, the ECJ will have the opportunity to 
further develop the “no possibilities” test it introduced 
in Marks & Spencer. Prior to this, it will have to indicate 
whether or not this test can also be invoked if a Member 
State’s restrictive tax rules are not (partially) justified 
by the need to prevent losses from being used twice. At 
the time this article was written, only Advocate General 
Kokott’s Opinion of 19 July 2012 was at the authors’ dis-
posal. In section 4. the authors address the facts of the A Oy 
case and the AG’s view on the applicability of the “no pos-
sibilities test”. Section 5. (also) addresses the AG’s inter-
pretation of the conditions of the “no possibilities” test.
A Oy concerns a Swedish transferring company that had 
merged into a Finnish receiving company, A Oy. The 
Swedish company had losses available for carry-for-
ward, but it no longer carried out any business activities 
in Sweden. Owing to practical difficulties, it turned out 
to be impossible to effectively offset the Swedish losses 
against the profits of Swedish group companies. There-
15. NL: ECJ, 25 Feb. 2010, Case C-337/08, X Holding BV v. Staatssecretaris van 
Financiën, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
decision by imposing an obligation on the Netherlands to 
allow the interest deduction, even though the right to tax 
the income derived from the Belgian immovable property 
was allocated exclusively to Belgium under the Nether-
lands-Belgium Income and Capital Tax Treaty (2001).11
In Schumacker, Marks & Spencer and Renneberg, the ECJ 
recognized the need to preserve a balanced allocation of 
taxing powers between Member States. As a rule, there-
fore, residents and non-residents may be treated differ-
ently by the Member States concerned. However, accord-
ing to the ECJ, an exception should be made to this main 
rule where the infringement of an EU fundamental 
freedom is disproportionate in relation to the objective 
pursued by the national measure. In these circumstances, 
Member States must remove the unequal treatment pro-
duced by the national measure.
3.  Balanced Allocation of Taxing Powers
As the ECJ recognizes that the need to preserve a balanced 
allocation of taxing powers may justify restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment, taxpayers who have sought to 
“import” foreign losses have hit a brick wall in a number 
of cases.
In Oy AA (Case C-231/05), a Finnish company requested 
that the Finnish tax authorities accept a transfer of Finnish 
profits to its loss-making UK parent company.12 The 
Finnish group contribution rules restricted such transfers 
by requiring that the transferor and transferee be Finnish 
resident companies. Although the ECJ viewed this as a 
restriction of the freedom of establishment, it acknowl-
edged that this restriction could be justified by the need 
to safeguard a balanced allocation of taxing powers and 
the need to prevent tax avoidance.
In Lidl Belgium (Case C-414/06),13 a German resident 
company was denied the possibility to deduct losses 
incurred by its Luxembourg PE, whereas, if the losses were 
incurred by a German PE, they would have been deduct-
ible. According to the ECJ, the preservation of a balanced 
allocation of taxing powers between Germany and Lux-
embourg might necessitate only applying the tax rules of 
that Member State to the Luxembourg PE, in respect of 
both profits and losses. The ECJ then cited the Marks & 
Spencer decision and reiterated that this only holds true 
if the possibilities for having the losses taken into account 
in Luxembourg have not been exhausted. 
In Krankenheim Wannsee (Case C-157/07),14 a German 
resident company carried on business through an Aus-
trian PE. Initially, the Austrian PE was loss-making and, 
under the then applicable rules, its losses were taken into 
11. Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital [unofficial 
translation] (5 June 2001), Treaties IBFD. 
12. FI: ECJ, 18 July 2007, Case C-231/05, Oy AA, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
13. DE: ECJ, 15 May 2008, Case C-414/06, Lidl Belgium GmbH & Co. KG v. 
Finanzamt Heilbronn, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
14. DE: ECJ, 23 Oct. 2008, Case C-157/07, Krankenheim Ruhesitz am 
Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt GmbH v. Finanzamt für Körperschaften III in 
Berlin, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
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the ECJ based the justification solely on the need to pre-
serve a balanced allocation of taxing powers and did not 
refer to the “no possibilities” test – was, therefore, correct 
in Kokott’s view. Accordingly, Kokott takes the position 
that the Finnish refusal to transfer Swedish losses is nec-
essary in view of the objective of preserving a balanced 
allocation of taxing powers. It is then irrelevant whether 
or not the losses of the Swedish subsidiary were exhausted 
in that Member State.19
A few observations should be made with regard to the AG’s 
Opinion. Although Kokott correctly notes that the need 
to preserve a balanced allocation has achieved a pivotal 
role in the ECJ’s case law on cross-border loss relief, this 
does not imply that the “no possibilities” test has lost its 
significance. The ECJ simply did not have to invoke this 
test in cases where only the balanced allocation of taxing 
powers was at stake, as none of these cases, including X 
Holding BV, actually concerned “final losses”. In addition, 
the authors do not share the AG’s view that the objective 
of preventing the double use of losses is not an autono-
mous justification. In the authors’ view, any objective, as 
long as it is a legitimate objective that is compatible with 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(2007),20 can qualify as an autonomous justification.21 
Furthermore, although Kokott correctly observes that 
the objective of preserving a balanced allocation of taxing 
powers is not achieved if a Member State is required to 
take into account losses incurred under the taxing power 
of another Member State, this, in itself, is not a convinc-
ing argument to disapply the “no possibilities” test. After 
all, the overriding need to preserve a balanced allocation 
of taxing powers can be regarded as a logical outcome of 
a balancing act between the Member States’ fiscal sover-
eignty in the area of direct taxation and the free movement 
provisions. If the adverse affect on free movement is too 
severe, a Member State’s national tax measure may have 
to give way to free movement, irrespective of the legiti-
macy of that measure’s objective. A parallel may be drawn 
here to a (heated) discussion in an entirely different field, 
namely the right of Muslim women to wear a headscarf. 
During the London Olympics, a Saudi Arabian judoka 
wished to play judo while wearing a headscarf. Here, her 
freedom of religion had to be weighed against the “prin-
ciples and spirit” of judo and general safety rules.22 Ulti-
mately, a compromise was reached where she was allowed 
to wear a “safe”, bathing cap-like headscarf. By contrast, 
if a Muslim female judge wants to wear a headscarf in the 
courtroom, her freedom of religion would be balanced 
19. AG Opinion in A Oy (C-123/11), paras. 48-54.
20. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of 13 December 
2007, OJ C115 (2008), EU Law IBFD. See UK: ECJ, 12 Dec. 2006, 
Case C-446/04, Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group 
Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, para. 133, ECJ Case Law 
IBFD.
21. In Lidl Belgium (C-414/06), para. 37, concerning the justifications based 
on (1) the need to preserve a balanced allocation of taxing powers and 
(2) the need to prevent the danger that losses may be taken into account 
twice, the ECJ observed that “[…] the two justifications put forward 
must each be considered as being capable of justifying a restriction on 
the freedom of establishment […]”.
22. See http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/30/sport/olympics-saudi-judo-
hijab/index.html.
fore, A Oy asked the Finnish tax authorities to allow for 
compensation of the Swedish losses against its Finnish 
profits. The Finnish tax rules, however, only allow for the 
transfer of losses to a receiving company under a purely 
Finnish merger.
The AG notes that the Finnish tax rules constitute a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment, as they allow 
a Finnish parent company to use the losses of a Finnish 
subsidiary in the event of a merger, but do not allow for 
this if the losses are from a business activity in another 
Member State that is not subject to Finnish tax.16
Addressing the justification for this restriction, the AG 
discusses Finland’s right to preserve a balanced alloca-
tion of taxing powers between Finland and Sweden. She 
refers to article 7(1) of the Nordic Convention (1996)17 – 
which provides that the business activity of the Swedish 
company falls within the exclusive power of taxation of 
Sweden – and concludes that Finland’s power of taxation 
would be impaired if it had to take into account losses 
from an activity that it cannot tax.18
The AG then examines whether or not the Finnish rules go 
further than what is necessary to achieve the objective of 
preserving a balanced allocation of taxing powers. She dis-
cusses the applicability of the Marks & Spencer exception. 
Here, she follows an original line of thought. She argues 
that that this exception can only be understood against the 
background of the justifications considered in Marks & 
Spencer, which not only include the objective of preserv-
ing a balanced allocation of taxing powers, but also the 
right to prevent losses from being used twice. In light of 
the latter objective, a national measure is disproportionate 
if it prevents a parent company from taking into account 
losses incurred by a foreign subsidiary, where the losses 
have been exhausted in the Member State of the subsid-
iary. According to the AG, however, the ECJ’s case law has 
evolved since Marks & Spencer and the objective of pre-
serving a balanced allocation of taxing powers has become 
a crucial, independent justification ground. By contrast, 
the objective of preventing double loss utilization is not an 
autonomous justification in the AG’s view. She, therefore, 
contends that the “no possibilities” test can no longer be 
applied if a justification is based on the need to preserve a 
balanced allocation of taxing powers. 
With regard to this justification ground, Kokott notes that 
it is only relevant to the issue of which taxing power a loss 
belongs to; it does not relate to the issue of whether or not 
the possibilities for using the loss in the Member State that 
has the power to tax a particular business activity have 
been exhausted. In fact, if a Member State has to take into 
account losses incurred in another Member State that can 
no longer be used there, she argues, the objective of pre-
serving a balanced allocation of taxing powers would not 
be achieved at all. The decision in X Holding BV – where 
16. AG Opinion in A Oy (C-123/11), para. 35.
17. Convention between the Nordic Countries for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (23 Sept. 1996), 
Treaties IBFD. 
18. AG Opinion in A Oy (C-123/11), para. 44.
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distinction between these concepts, legal exhaustion of the 
possibilities to take into account losses exists where, for 
instance, a carry forward term for loss utilization expires 
and losses become “final”. Factual exhaustion occurs, for 
example, where a loss-making foreign subsidiary is liquid-
ated and its activities cease.
In the Marks & Spencer litigation following the ECJ’s deci-
sion, various UK courts addressed this matter. The first 
was the High Court where Park J interpreted the “no possi-
bilities” test as meaning,25 “recognised possibilities legally 
available given the objective facts of the company’s situ-
ation at the relevant time”.
The Court of Appeal also clarified what was meant by this 
test. Chadwick LJ held that its conditions would not be 
satisfied:26
[…] if the claimant did no more than demonstrate that it was 
improbable or unlikely, or that there was little or no real likeli-
hood, or that the claimant (or the surrendering company) had no 
intention, that losses could or would be set against future profits. 
[…] Given the context, the phrase ‘no possibility’ in the second 
condition is to be read as ‘no real possibility’; in the sense that 
a real possibility is one which cannot be dismissed as fanciful.
Following appeals to the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper 
Tribunal, one of the questions before the Court of Appeal 
was whether the “no possibilities” test should be per-
formed on the basis of the facts of an individual case or 
whether this test should be regarded as a matter of prin-
ciple.27 The UK Revenue had submitted that once a sur-
rendering company is permitted to satisfy the conditions 
of the “no possibilities” test by reference to its particular 
factual situation at the time of its claim, it offers the tax-
payer the opportunity to choose where the losses may be 
relieved. Ironically, this could give rise to the “trafficking 
of losses”, which the ECJ had sought to prevent in Marks 
& Spencer.28 The Court of Appeal, however, concluded 
that it was bound by the decision to answer the question 
of whether or not the “no possibilities” test had been met 
by reference to the facts as at the date of the claim. These 
objective facts would have to show whether there was a 
real, as opposed to a fanciful, possibility for losses to be 
taken into account in future periods.29
As the German Federal Tax Court decisions on 9 June 
2010 have received extensive coverage in the academic 
literature,30 the authors confine themselves to a concise 
summary here. Case I R 100/09 (2010)31 involved a German 
resident company that carried on business through a loss-
making French PE. The French losses that were incurred 
in 1999 expired in 2004 owing to a five-year restriction 
25. UK: HC, 11 Apr. 2006, Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey (Inspector of Taxes), 
[2006] EWHC 811 Ch; [2006] STC 1235. 
26. UK: CA, 20 Feb. 2007, Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey (Inspector of Taxes), 
[2007] EWCA Civ 117; [2008] STC 526.
27. UK: CA, 14 Oct. 2011, HMRC v. Marks & Spencer, [2011] EWCA Civ 
1156, para. 26.
28. HMRC v. Marks & Spencer (2011), paras. 27-29. See also P.J. Wattel’s 
annotation to Marks & Spencer, supra n. 1, point 21.
29. HMRC v. Marks & Spencer (2011), para. 46.
30. See, inter alia, A. Bal, New Case Law Developments in Germany: Finality 
of Foreign Permanent Establishment Losses, 52 Eur. Taxn. 1, p. 46 (2012), 
Journals IBFD.
31. DE: FTC, 9 June 2010, I R 100/09.
against the principle of neutrality of the judiciary. In many 
non-Muslim states, the latter principle prevails and she 
would not be allowed to do so under any circumstances.
5.  The “No Possibilities” Test
5.1.  Introduction
What emerges from sections 2. and 3. is that the ECJ has 
erected a barrier against the cross-border compensa-
tion of losses by attaching importance to the need to pre-
serve a balanced allocation of taxing powers. A loophole 
remains, however, where the issue is the compensation 
of “final losses”.
In Marks & Spencer, the ECJ formulated the conditions 
under which losses can be characterized as “final losses”:23
 – the non-resident subsidiary has exhausted the possi-
bilities available in its State of residence of having the 
losses taken into account for the accounting period 
concerned by the claim for relief and also for previ-
ous accounting periods, if necessary by transferring 
those losses to a third party or by offsetting the losses 
against the profits made by the subsidiary in previ-
ous periods, and
 – there is no possibility for the foreign subsidiary’s 
losses to be taken into account in its State of residence 
for future periods either by the subsidiary itself or by 
a third party, in particular where the subsidiary has 
been sold to that third party.
Losses are thus exhausted if a series of cumulative require-
ments are met: (1) the subsidiary’s losses cannot be carried 
forward, nor can they be carried back against the subsid-
iary’s own profits, (2) the subsidiary’s losses cannot be 
utilized by transferring them to a third party; and (3) the 
subsidiary’s losses cannot be utilized by a third party, 
in particular where the subsidiary has been sold to that 
third party. If these conditions are fulfilled, the freedom 
of establishment prevails over a given allocation of taxing 
powers provided the exercise of the latter powers places 
a disproportionate burden on the exercise of this funda-
mental freedom.
The interpretation of the “no possibilities” test was in 
dispute in, inter alia, the post-Marks & Spencer litigation in 
the United Kingdom and in two decisions of the German 
Federal Tax Court (Bundesfinanzhof) of 9 June 2010.24 In 
sections 5.2. and 5.3. the authors compare (and comment 
on) the views expressed by these national courts on several 
elements of the concept of “final losses”. The positions 
taken by Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion in the 
A Oy case are also addressed.
5.2.  Legal or factual exhaustion
In the Marks & Spencer decision, the ECJ did not specify 
whether the “no possibilities” test requires legal exhaus-
tion, or whether this test (also) requires factual exhaustion 
of the possibilities of loss compensation. To exemplify the 
23. Marks & Spencer (C-247/08), para. 55.
24. DE: Federal Tax Court (Bundesfinanzhof), 9 June 2010, I R 100/09 and I 
R 107/09.
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S, it is easy to identify the legally exhausted losses, but it 
would be commercially undesirable to transform these 
losses into factually exhausted losses, as that would entail 
ceasing the activity in its entirety in M/S S.
Second, the authors do not regard losses arising out of legal 
exhaustion as disparities: they are disadvantages caused by 
discriminatory loss-relief rules in M/S P, which, under the 
conditions laid down in Marks & Spencer, should also be 
removed by that Member State. 
5.3.  Different tax rules in M/S P and M/S S
The identification of “final losses” and their calculation 
becomes even more complicated in the face of differences 
between the tax rules of M/S P and M/S S. In Marks & 
Spencer, the ECJ did not have to touch upon this sensi-
tive matter,36 as “[i]t is clear from the file before the Court 
that both parties to the main proceedings agree that the 
losses must be computed on a United Kingdom tax basis.”
If no agreement is reached on the computation of the 
losses, at one end of the scale, there may be temporary dif-
ferences in the calculation of the amount of the losses, for 
instance, due to different rules regarding the depreciation 
of immovable property. At the other end of the scale, the 
calculation of the amount of “final losses” may be affected 
by permanent differences created, for example, by varying 
thin capitalization rules. In this sense, it may even happen 
that a subsidiary will be loss-making according to the tax 
rules of M/S S, but profitable according to the tax rules 
of M/S P.37
In the post-Marks & Spencer litigation in the United 
Kingdom, the Court of Appeal addressed the problem of 
a loss being recognized in M/S P in year one, but not being 
recognized in M/S S until year two. Marks & Spencer had 
contended, and the Tribunals had agreed, that group relief 
should be available in year one, although the relevant sub-
sidiary did not suffer any losses in that year.38 The UK 
Revenue challenged this view, arguing that the difference 
in timing of the loss “is merely the inevitable consequence 
of the two different tax systems”.39 Hence, the UK Revenue 
sought to dispose of the matter by treating it as a “dispar-
ity”, outside the scope of the free movement provisions.40 
The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument empha-
sizing that the comparison that should be made is with 
the situation of losses being sustained by a UK resident 
36. Marks & Spencer (C-247/08), para. 22. As Lang observes, it, therefore, 
remains an outstanding question how one should cope with these 
differences. See M. Lang, The Marks & Spencer Case – The Open Issues 
Following the ECJ’s Final Word, 46 Eur. Taxn. 2, p. 62 (2006), Journals 
IBFD.
37. Of course, the reverse is also possible: the company could be profitable 
according to the tax rules of M/S S, but loss making according to the tax 
rules of M/S P.
38. HMRC v. Marks & Spencer (2011), para. 76.
39. HMRC v. Marks & Spencer (2011), para. 85.
40. The UK Revenue, inter alia, suggested that the key to resolving the 
controversy was in UK: Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, 23 
Feb. 2006, Case C-374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group 
Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, para. 65, ECJ Case Law 
IBFD, in which Advocate General Geelhoed acknowledged that the 
co-existence of discrete national tax systems entails disparities between 
these systems.
on the carry forward of losses under French tax law. In 
2005, the PE’s activities ceased. Case I R 107/09 (2010)32 
also concerned a German resident company carrying on 
its business through a French PE. It incurred French losses 
in the period 1998-2001, until the French activities were 
liquidated in September 2001. The 2000 and 2001 losses 
could not be utilized by way of carry back or carry forward. 
In both cases, the German resident company sought to 
offset the French losses against its German taxable income.
In Case I R 100/09, the German Federal Tax Court rejected 
the notion that legal exhaustion would suffice to meet the 
conditions of the “no possibilities” test. Accordingly, it 
denied compensation for the 1999 loss. Although this 
loss had also become factually exhausted in 2005 due to 
the French activities ceasing, the Court did not relent; it 
observed that the finality of the loss in France was caused 
by the expiration of the five-year carry-forward term. It 
regarded the impossibility of deducting the French loss as 
a disparity,33 therefore, not compelling Germany to allow 
for cross-border loss-relief. In contrast to Case I R 100/09, 
in Case I R 107/09, the Court did accept the cross-bor-
der compensation of the French losses, as these losses had 
become factually exhausted in 2001 due to the liquidation 
of the French activities. In obiter dictum, the Court noted 
that exhaustion of losses could also be triggered by a con-
version of a PE into a subsidiary or by the transfer of the 
assets and liabilities of a PE to a third party.34
In her Opinion in the A Oy case, Advocate General Kokott 
is critical of the application of the “no possibilities” test 
in regard to a merger. She more or less has the same sus-
picions as the UK Revenue in the post-Marks & Spencer 
litigation: in deciding on a merger, merging companies 
can freely choose the place where the losses of the trans-
ferring company are taken into account. In particular, 
she expresses the concern that the transferring company 
would forgo the possibility of using its loss, for instance, 
through a deliberately belated application for an accumu-
lated loss to be taken into account.35
In the authors’ view, both legal and factual exhaustion of 
the possibilities of loss utilization in the Member State of 
the subsidiary (M/S S) should give rise to compensation 
of these losses in the Member State of the parent company 
(M/S P). Naturally, it should first be established that losses 
incurred by a resident subsidiary would also have been 
deductible at the level of the parent company. The authors 
reject the Court’s refusal to accept compensation of legally 
exhausted losses for two reasons. 
First, that outcome implies an artificial incentive to cease 
foreign activities solely because of expiring losses, rather 
than continuing the activities and aiming for future prof-
itability. If the expired losses are start-up losses that are 
incurred in regard to the entire activity carried on in M/S 
32. DE: FTC, 9 June 2010, I R 107/09.
33. In para. 10 it referred, inter alia, to DE: ECJ, 28 Feb. 2008, Case C-293/06, 
Deutsche Shell GmbH v. Finanzamt für Grossunternehmen in Hamburg, 
para. 42, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
34. These transactions are listed in DE: Income Tax Act 
(Einkommensteuergesetz) art. 2a(4), National Legislation IBFD.
35. AG Opinion in A Oy (C-123/11), paras. 55-60.
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Directive (2009/133).47 In regard to each type of restruc-
turing operation, a taxpayer may be faced with an exhaus-
tion of losses, either legally or factually, in one or more 
jurisdictions. Potentially, the impossibility of utilizing the 
exhausted losses will hamper the realization of commer-
cially desirable restructuring. This explains why carry-
over of losses has been explicitly dealt with in article 6 of 
the Merger Directive, which stipulates that:48
[t]o the extent that, if the operations referred to in Article 1, 
paragraph a, [of the Merger Directive] were effected between 
companies from the Member State of the transferring company, 
the Member State would apply provisions allowing the receiv-
ing company to take over the losses of the transferring company 
which had not yet been exhausted for tax purposes, it shall ex-
tend those provisions to cover the takeover of such losses by the 
receiving company’s permanent establishments situated within 
its territory.
There are several limitations attached to the possibility 
of loss relief pursuant to article 6 of the Merger Directive 
(2009/133).49 In the first place, the domestic law of the 
Member State of the transferring company should allow a 
receiving company to take over the non-exhausted losses 
of a transferring company in a purely domestic situation.50 
This is problematic, for instance, in Germany, where the 
possibility to carry over losses to a receiving company was 
abolished due to fears of the budgetary implications of 
Marks & Spencer. As the right of a receiving company to 
take over a transferring company’s losses in the context 
of a domestic merger has been disallowed, Germany can 
rightly argue that it should also not be compelled to allow 
for the compensation of losses of a non-resident trans-
ferring company.51 According to Breuninger (2006),52 
however, there is no end to the matter since, in a purely 
domestic situation, companies would still have been able 
47. EU Merger Directive (2009): Council Directive 2009/133/EC of 19 
October 2009 on the Common System of Taxation Applicable to Mergers, 
Divisions, Partial Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of Shares 
Concerning Companies of Different Member States and to the Transfer of 
the Registered Office of an SE or SCE between Member States (Codified 
Version), OJ L310 (2009), EU Law IBFD. 
48. For an excellent discussion of the treatment of losses under the Merger 
Directive, see J. Bezzina, The Treatment of Losses under the EC Merger 
Directive 1990, 42 Eur. Taxn. 2, pp. 57-71 (2002), Journals IBFD.
49. J. Calleja Borg sees several other limitations on the possibility of loss relief 
pursuant to article 6 of the Merger Directive (2009/133), such as: (1) the 
absence of a definition of “losses”, (2) the lack of rules if only a portion 
of the transferring company’s losses can be carried over to the (PE of 
the) receiving company, and (3) the lack of clear indications as to what 
“valid commercial reasons” entail within the meaning of article 15 of the 
Merger Directive. See J. Calleja Borg, Non-exhausted Losses and the Merger 
Directive: What It Fails to Say, Intertax 11, pp. 557-563 (2011).
50. See also Commission of the European Communities, Commission 
Staff Working Paper, Company Taxation in the Internal Market, 
COM(2001)582 final, 23 Oct. 2001, p. 296, EU law IBFD: “[u]sually 
national legislation either forbids the losses of the acquired company to be 
transferred to the acquiring company or only allows this to be undertaken 
subject to a number of restrictions. The fact that deferrable losses cannot 
be transferred from the acquired company to the acquiring company is 
clearly an impediment to restructuring operations. It means companies 
are more likely to abandon or defer any restructuring operations they 
might have planned and thus negatively influences the competitive status 
of EU business”.
51. See J. Englisch, Reform of the Reorganization Tax Act and Related Changes, 
47 Eur. Taxn. 7, pp. 342-343 (2007). 
52. G.E. Breuninger, Restructuring and Reorganizing the European Group, 
German Tax Law Aspects, available at http://meetings.abanet.org/
meeting/tax/ROME06/media/Breuninger.pdf .
subsidiary. Accordingly, it held that the losses should be 
deductible in year one despite reallocating the losses to a 
different accounting period.41
In her Opinion in the A Oy case, Advocate General Kokott 
argues that the losses to be taken into account must in 
principle be calculated according to the tax law of M/S 
P. She considers this necessary to achieve an equal treat-
ment between cases within a single Member State and 
cross-border situations. Kokott dismisses the submis-
sions of the Commission and the Finnish that the loss to 
be taken into account should be maximized according to 
the amount calculated under the tax law of M/S S; such 
a limitation would obstruct the attainment of the desired 
equal treatment between an inland and a cross-border 
merger.42 Kokott sees one possible exception to the main 
rule that losses are to be calculated according to the rules 
in M/S P, and that is where the loss in M/S S is increased, 
for instance, by tax incentives in M/S S, such as higher 
depreciation. In those cases, M/S P may “ignore” the in-
creased amount of the loss.
In the authors’ view, in determining the extent to which 
losses are to be taken into account in M/S P, the point of 
departure from the ECJ’s case law is that the freedom of 
establishment’s objective is to remove disproportionate 
impediments to cross-border establishment.43 This means 
that Member States may not neutralize the budgetary con-
sequences of cross-border establishment by imposing a 
compensatory levy on the taxpayer44 since, in the fre-
quently used words of the ECJ:45
[f]reedom of establishment cannot […] be understood as 
meaning that a Member State is required to draw up its 
tax rules on the basis of those in another Member State 
in order to ensure, in all circumstances, taxation which 
removes any disparities arising from national tax rules.
Accordingly, it should be determined, according to the tax 
rules of M/S P, if there is a “final loss”. This implies that 
if M/S P has a five-year carry-forward term for loss com-
pensation, while M/S S has an unlimited carry-forward 
term, a six-year old loss of the subsidiary should still be 
regarded as a “final loss”. In addition, the tax rules of M/S 
P should also be applied in calculating the amount of the 
subsidiary’s “final loss”.46
6.  Cross-Border Restructuring Operations
6.1.  Introduction
Multinational companies may engage in various types of 
cross-border restructuring operations, for example, those 
listed in articles 2(a)–2(e) and article 2(k) of the Merger 
41. HMRC v. Marks & Spencer (2011), paras. 87-88.
42. AG Opinion in A Oy (C-123/11), paras. 73-75.
43. See, inter alia, NL: ECJ, 29 Nov. 2011, Case C-371/10, National Grid Indus 
BV v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond / kantoor Rotterdam, para. 
62, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
44. DE: ECJ, 26 Oct. 1999, Case C-294/97, Eurowings Luftverkehr AG v. 
Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna, para. 46, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
45. Deutsche Shell (C-293/06).
46. HMRC v. Marks & Spencer (2011), para. 76.
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non-resident (EU) subsidiary is liquidated, even though 
M/S P does not discriminate between resident and non-
resident subsidiaries.
Turning to the ECJ’s direct taxation case law, it appears that 
it builds predominantly on a concept of discrimination.57 
However, the ECJ has also reiterated, in cases regarding 
direct taxation, that the free movement provisions require 
the “abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without 
distinction […], when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise 
impede” a cross-border activity.58 Hence, the identifica-
tion of a discriminatory element does not seem to be a 
prerequisite for establishing a restriction on the freedom 
of establishment. As holding 100% of the shares in a non-
resident (EU) subsidiary is an activity that falls within the 
scope of the freedom of establishment,59 the impossibility 
of a parent company taking into account a loss upon the 
liquidation of its subsidiary can be viewed as an obstacle 
to the parent company’s freedom of establishment. Sub-
sequently, one could argue that a “liquidation loss” of a 
non-resident (EU) subsidiary should be deductible in M/S 
P since it constitutes a “final loss”.
Two issues should be distinguished here: (1) can the 
parent company take into account the operational losses 
incurred by the subsidiary and (2) can the parent company 
deduct the loss on the shares in the subsidiary? It emerges 
from the Rewe (Case C-347/04) case that the ECJ differ-
entiates between both categories of losses.60 Regarding the 
first issue: taxing the parent company as an autonomous 
entity, hence disregarding the results of its subsidiary, is 
a legitimate means of exercising fiscal jurisdiction by M/S 
P. M/S P’s fiscal sovereignty would be eroded too severely 
if the freedom of establishment were to imply that M/S P 
would be forced to abandon this system. Concerning the 
second issue, here the loss on the shares in the subsid-
iary is exempt under the participation exemption rules. 
By exempting these losses (i.e. they become non-deduct-
ible), M/S P is introducing a rule that, although applying in 
a non-discriminatory manner, still restricts cross-border 
establishment. In this situation, the freedom of establish-
ment could outweigh M/S P’s fiscal sovereignty and could 
compel that Member State to allow the parent company to 
deduct the loss on its shareholding. In this situation, the 
balanced allocation of taxing powers between M/S P and 
57. On non-discriminatory tax obstacles and direct taxation, see S.C.W. 
Douma, Non-discriminatory tax obstacles to free movement, in Europäisches 
Steuerrecht – Festschrift für Friedrich Rödler zum 60. Geburtstag pp. 
193-203 (Linde Verlag 2010).
58. See, inter alia, Deutsche Shell (C-293/06), para. 28 and National Grid Indus 
(C-371/10), para. 36.
59. In NL: ECJ, 7 Sep. 2006, Case C-470/04, N v. Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Almelo, para. 30, ECJ Case Law IBFD, the 
ECJ held that: “a Community national, such as the applicant in the main 
proceedings, who has been living in one Member State since the transfer 
of his residence and who holds all the shares of companies established in 
another Member State, may rely on Article 43 EC”.
60. DE: ECJ, 29 Mar. 2007, Case C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz eG v. 
Finanzamt Köln-Mitte, para. 48, ECJ Case Law IBFD: “[t]he losses at issue 
in the main proceedings are incurred by the parent company because of 
the reduction in the book value of its shareholdings subsidiaries. Those 
losses related to the writing down of the book value of the shareholdings 
are taken into account only as regards the parent company and are 
subject, for tax purposes, to a different treatment from that which applies 
to losses incurred by the subsidiaries themselves”.
to offset losses under the German “Organschaft” rules53 
and furthermore, the impossibility of carrying over losses 
still constitutes a restriction on a “particular method of 
exercise of the freedom of establishment”.54
In the second place, article 6 of the Merger Directive 
(2009/133) is silent on (1) whether the Member State of 
the receiving company should take into account the losses 
of the transferring company and (2) whether the Member 
State of a transferring company should accept the com-
pensation of the losses incurred in the Member State of 
the receiving company. One could infer from Lidl Belgium 
that, in regard to “final losses”, the first question should be 
answered affirmatively, whereas Futura suggests a nega-
tive answer to the second question, since a PE state cannot 
be compelled to take into account losses incurred in the 
state of residence.55
In the third place, not only is the Merger Directive’s mate-
rial scope limited to the restructuring operations listed 
in article 2, but its personal and territorial scope is also 
restricted by the requirement that companies from two 
or more Member States must be involved (article 1(a) in 
conjunction with article 3 of the Merger Directive). For 
situations outside its scope, the authors review in sections 
6.2.–6.4. – by means of a number of examples – whether 
or not a taxpayer can invoke the freedom of establishment 
to avail itself of loss compensation. The examples are styl-
ized in such a way that they fully reflect the difficulties of 
applying the “no possibilities” test.
6.2.  Non-discriminatory tax obstacles
Marks & Spencer concerned the UK group relief rules. 
However, certain Member States do not provide for any 
type of group taxation regime.56
Assume that one of these Member States does not allow a 
resident parent company to take into account a “liquida-
tion loss” where a subsidiary – either resident or non-resi-
dent – is liquidated. If the participation exemption applies 
to the income derived from the subsidiary, a loss on the 
shares in the subsidiary is generally not deductible either. 
Accordingly, one cannot identify a difference in treat-
ment between the liquidation of a resident subsidiary 
and a non-resident subsidiary. The question is, however, 
whether or not the freedom of establishment may compel 
M/S P to take into account a “liquidation loss” where a 
53. We expect the ECJ to decide that disadvantages that arise out of the 
limitation of the German “Organschaft” regime to taxpayers earning 
German taxable income are justified by the need to safeguard the 
balanced allocation of taxing powers, in a similar way as in the X Holding 
BV decision. For an overview of German case law on the compatibility of 
the German “Organschaft” rules with the freedom of establishment, see 
A. Cordewener, Cross-border loss relief and the “effet utile” of EU law, EC 
Tax Rev. 2, p. 60, footnote 27 (2011).
54. DE: ECJ, 13 Dec. 2005, Case C-411/03, SEVIC Systems Aktiengesellschaft 
v. Amtsgericht Neuwied, para. 19, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
55. LU: ECJ, 15 May 1997, Case C-250/95, Futura Participations SA and Singer 
v. Administration des contributions, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
56. From a study conducted in 2011, it appears that 6 of the 27 Member States 
do not provide for any type of group taxation regime. See G.F. Boulogne, 
Group Taxation within the European Union: Did Papillon and Art. 24(5) of 
the OECD Model Tax Convention Create a Butterfly Effect?, 51 Eur. Taxn. 
5, pp. 177-178 (2011), Journals IBFD.
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allow for compensation of the pre-”change of ownership”-
losses affect, in M/S P, the characterization of these losses 
as “final losses”? In this regard, it seems to follow from 
the ECJ’s earlier case law that the (possible) non-compli-
ance of EU law by one Member State (M/S S) cannot be 
brought forward by another Member State (M/S P) as an 
argument for being less diligent in complying with its own 
EU obligations.67
6.4.  Losses and transfers of seat
The restructuring operations covered by the Merger Dir-
ective (2009/133) include transfers of a registered office 
of SEs and SCEs from one Member State to another.68 In 
regard to such operations, article 10c(2) of the Merger 
Directive contains a special provision on the carry-over 
of losses:
[t]o the extent that a company transferring its registered office 
within the territory of a Member State would be allowed to carry 
forward or carry back losses which had not been exhausted for 
tax purposes, that Member State shall allow the permanent es-
tablishment, situated within its territory, of the SE or of the SCE 
transferring its registered office, to take over those losses of the 
SE or SCE which have not been exhausted for tax purposes, pro-
vided that the loss carry forward or carry back would have been 
available in comparable circumstances to a company which con-
tinued to have its registered office or which continued to be tax 
resident in that Member State.
Similar to the other loss carry-over provisions of the 
Merger Directive, article 10c(2) provides that losses of a 
company transferring its registered office can be carried 
over to a PE in the Member State of departure. A transfer 
of a company’s registered office, one type of a transfer of 
seat, is an act of establishment69 that is not restricted to 
SEs and SCEs.70 The questions arise (1) whether or not 
the host Member State may be obliged to allow for the 
compensation of “final losses” incurred in the Member 
State of departure and (2) conversely, whether or not the 
Member State of departure may be compelled to allow 
for the compensation of “final losses” incurred in the host 
Member State.71
Regarding the first question, one could think of a Nether-
lands resident company that transfers its place of effective 
management and all of its assets to Member State Y. Upon 
migration, tax losses remain outstanding in the Nether-
lands. If the company subsequently becomes profitable 
in Member State Y, can it offset (a part of) its profits real-
ized in Member State Y against its outstanding Nether-
lands losses? In answering this question, it should first 
be established that the inability to use the outstanding 
67. See, inter alia, LU: ECJ, 13 Nov. 1964, Joined Cases 90/63 and 91/63, 
Commission of the European Economic Community v. Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg and Kingdom of Belgium.
68. See art. 1(b) in conjunction with art. 2(j) of the Merger Directive.
69. See, in pertinent part, para. 6 of the Preamble of the 2005 amending 
Directive: “[t]he transfer of the registered office of a company is a means 
of exercising freedom of establishment”. 
70. See J.W. Bellingwout, Cartesio: mijlpaal en doorbraak na Daily Mail, 
Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 6800, pp. 217-227 (2009).
71. If one does not share the authors’ view that these “factually” exhausted 
losses would qualify as “final losses”, one could also think of the company’s 
“legally” exhausted losses, which are forfeited under article 20(2) of the 
CITA.
M/S S is not at stake: the loss on the shareholding is – by 
nature – only “visible” in M/S P.61
6.3.  “Change of ownership” rules 
Various Member States have “change of ownership” rules 
that trigger the forfeiture of (a part of) a subsidiary’s losses 
upon a significant change of its ownership.62 Generally, 
these rules seek to prevent trading in loss-making com-
panies.63 As an example, if Company A SA, resident in 
Member State X, acquires all the shares in Netherlands 
resident company B BV, the losses of B BV may be for-
feited under the Netherlands tax rules.64
As the acquisition of a 100% shareholding in another 
Member State is an act of (secondary) establishment, one 
could argue that the Netherlands “change of ownership” 
rules are in breach of the freedom of establishment, as they 
make the establishment of A SA in the Netherlands less 
attractive.65 As the rules do not distinguish between resi-
dent and non-resident shareholders, they may, as in the 
example in section 5.2. above, constitute a non-discrim-
inatory obstacle to the freedom of establishment. Absent 
a sufficient justification for this restriction, the Nether-
lands might be compelled to allow for the compensation 
of the pre-”change of ownership”-losses against B BV’s 
future profits.
An extra dimension is added to this analysis if, under 
the group taxation regime in Member State X, losses of a 
qualifying resident subsidiary can be offset “horizontally” 
against a resident parent company’s profits.66 Assume that 
the group taxation regime is only open to resident com-
panies or non-resident companies that carry on business 
in Member State X through a PE. What arises is arguably 
a Marks & Spencer-type situation: M/S P has a discrimina-
tory group taxation regime and losses have become legally 
exhausted in M/S S. In the authors’ view, it follows from 
Krankenheim Wannsee that M/S P should only be obliged 
to allow for a deduction of the losses incurred in M/S S if 
these losses also qualify as “final losses” according to the 
tax rules of M/S P. This is the situation if M/S P also has 
its own “change of ownership” rules in place. A relevant 
question here is: does the obligation imposed on M/S S to 
61. See Rewe Zentralfinanz (C-347/04) para. 43: “[h]owever, a difference in 
tax treatment between resident parent companies according to whether 
or not they have subsidiaries abroad cannot be justified merely by the 
fact that they have decided to carry on economic activities in another 
Member State, in which the State concerned cannot exercise its taxing 
powers. Accordingly, an argument based on the balanced allocation of 
the power to impose taxes between the Member States cannot in itself 
justify a Member State systematically refusing to grant a tax advantage 
to a resident parent company, on the grounds that that company has 
developed a cross-border economic activity which does not have the 
immediate result of generating tax revenues for that State”.
62. See, inter alia, W. Kessler & R. Eicke, Losing the Losses – The New German 
Change-of-Ownership Rule, Tax Notes Intl., pp. 1045-1048 (10 Dec. 2007).
63. See, D.R. Post & K.P.E. Stals, The Tax Treatment of Corporate Losses: A 
Comparative Study, Intertax 4, pp. 236-237 (2012).
64. See, inter alia, NL: Corporate Income Tax Act (Wet op de 
vennootschapsbelasting 1969 – CITA), art. 20a, National Legislation IBFD.
65. See S.C.W. Douma, Non-discriminatory Tax Obstacles, EC Tax Rev. 2, pp. 
67-83 (2012).
66. The authors assume that losses incurred by a subsidiary prior to its 
inclusion in the group taxation regime can also be set off “horizontally” 
against the profits of other group members.
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ber State of origin to revalue, at the time of realisation of the asset 
concerned, a tax debt which was definitively determined at the 
time when the company in question, because of the transfer of 
its place of effective management, ceased to be subject to tax in 
the latter Member State.
Given the unambiguous wording used by the ECJ, it is 
questionable whether or not the Netherlands is compelled 
to take into account the losses incurred in Member State 
Y by forgiving the existing Netherlands tax debt. If the 
losses incurred in Member State Y can be offset against 
future profits in Member State Y, these losses cannot be 
regarded as “final losses”. Accordingly, the “no possibili-
ties” test cannot be invoked as an ultima ratio to set aside 
the general notion that the Member State of departure 
does not have to take into account subsequent decreases 
in value. If, however, the losses incurred in Member State 
Y do qualify as “final losses” (for example, because the 
company’s activities in that Member State have ceased) it 
seems unsatisfactory that a domestic transfer of the com-
pany’s place of management (no taxation of the capital 
gain incorporated into the assets) is treated more favour-
ably than a cross-border transfer of the company’s place of 
management (the capital gain incorporated into the assets 
would be taxed even though it never materializes).
7.  Conclusions
The reach of the “no possibilities” test that was 
introduced in Marks & Spencer is still far from clear. 
Further litigation before national courts and the 
ECJ is, therefore, expected. In the A Oy case, the ECJ 
will have to answer the question of whether or not 
the “no possibilities” test can be invoked to set off a 
non-resident transferring company’s losses against a 
receiving company’s profits.
In the authors’ view, one should bear in mind 
the nature of the “no possibilities” test: which is 
an application of the principle of proportionality 
“stricto sensu”. In the context of cross-border loss 
compensation, this means a balancing act between 
(1) the legitimate objective of preserving a balanced 
allocation of taxing powers and (2) the gravity of the 
restriction of the freedom of establishment. In this 
light, the authors argue that both legal and factual 
exhaustion of the possibilities of loss utilization may 
trigger “final losses”, which should be deductible in 
another Member State. In calculating a subsidiary’s 
“final losses”, the authors believe that the tax rules of 
M/S P should be applied.
An outstanding question is whether or not non-
discriminatory tax measures can compel a Member 
State to allow for the compensation of “final losses” 
incurred in another Member State. For instance, 
if the Member State of a parent company does 
not offer the possibility to take into account a 
“liquidation loss” upon the liquidation of a resident 
subsidiary, should it be obliged to do so under the 
“no possibilities” test where a non-resident subsidiary 
is liquidated? This matter is also relevant in regard 
Netherlands losses constitutes an obstacle to the com-
pany’s freedom of establishment. This is possible if one 
regards the impossibility to offset the profits realized 
in Member State Y against the Netherlands losses as an 
obstacle that diminishes the effectiveness of the compa-
ny’s freedom of establishment. Perhaps, one could also 
establish that there is discriminatory treatment here if a 
foreign company that becomes subject to corporate tax 
in Member State Y cannot offset its outstanding losses, 
whereas losses incurred by a sole proprietorship (subject 
to personal income tax in Member State Y) prior to its 
conversion to a company of Member State Y (subject to 
corporate income tax in Member State Y) can be offset 
effectively against the profits of that company. Turning to 
a possible justification for this restriction, the need to pre-
serve a balanced allocation of taxing powers between the 
Netherlands and Member State Y can be put forward as a 
reason to generally deny the compensation of the Neth-
erlands losses against the profits realized in Member State 
Y. Nonetheless, as the losses can be characterized as “final” 
– they can no longer be taken into account in the Nether-
lands due to the lack of a business activity carried on there 
– one could argue that the outstanding Netherlands losses 
should be deductible in Member State Y.
Concerning the second question, assume this time that the 
company does not have any Netherlands losses available 
for carry forward upon its migration. In contrast, at the 
time the company transfers its place of effective manage-
ment to Member State Y, the amount of Netherlands tax is 
definitively established on the basis of a (deemed) capital 
gain (the company’s assets contain hidden reserves). In line 
with National Grid Indus, this tax is not recovered until the 
capital gain incorporated into the assets is realized.72 After 
arrival in Member State Y, however, the company engages 
in a downward spiral and fails to become profitable. Does 
this mean that the company’s Netherlands tax liability is 
erased? In this regard, in National Grid Indus, the ECJ 
draws a clear dividing line between (1) the definitive estab-
lishment of the amount of tax and (2) the recovery of the 
tax.73 Although, rationally, the profits incorporated into 
the assets will no longer be realized, the Netherlands tax 
may – in principle – remain outstanding. 
Although the fact that it is impossible to offset the losses 
incurred in Member State Y against the Netherlands 
profits would constitute an obstacle to the company’s 
freedom of establishment, the Netherlands could justify 
not taking into account the losses incurred in Member 
State Y by arguing that, under the “principle of territorial-
ity linked to a temporal component”,74 it is entitled to tax 
profits that have accrued in its territory prior to the migra-
tion to Member State Y without taking into account sub-
sequent decreases in value. In this regard, the ECJ explic-
itly held in National Grid Indus that:75
a possible omission by the host Member State to take account of 
decreases in value does not impose any obligation on the Mem-
72. National Grid Indus (C-371/10), para. 65.
73. National Grid Indus (C-371/10), para. 86.
74. National Grid Indus (C-371/10), para. 60.
75. National Grid Indus (C-371/10), para. 61.
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to loss compensation forfeited under “change of 
ownership” rules or a transfer of losses outside the 
scope of articles 6 and 10c(2) of the Merger Directive 
(2009/133). Finally, an open issue is whether or not 
the obligation to take into account “final losses” 
may run counter to the ECJ’s stance in National 
Grid Indus that the Member State of departure is 
not required to take into account decreases in value 
arising in the host Member State.
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